This paper incorporates a global bank into a two-country business cycle model. The bank collects deposits from households and makes loans to entrepreneurs, in both countries. It has to finance a fraction of loans using equity. We investigate how such a bank capital requirement affects the international transmission of productivity and loan default shocks. Three findings emerge. First, the bank's capital requirement has little effect on the international transmission of productivity shocks. Second, the contribution of loan default shocks to business cycle fluctuations is negligible under normal economic conditions. Third, an exceptionally large loan loss originating in one country induces a sizeable and simultaneous decline in economic activity in both countries. This is particularly noteworthy, as the 2007-09 global financial crisis was characterized by large credit losses in the US and a simultaneous sharp output reduction in the US and the Euro Area. Our results thus suggest that global banks may have played an important role in the international transmission of the crisis.
Introduction
During the recent (2007) (2008) (2009) ) financial crisis, economic activity collapsed simultaneously in the United States and in the Euro Area (EA). This is striking as, typically, the US business cycle leads the EA business cycle. Several indicators suggest that the crisis was triggered by specific developments in the US. House price indices, for instance, started to plummet by mid-2006 in the US, but have been holding up well in the EA (ECB, 2010) . In addition, while both US and EA banks suffered large loan losses, almost all losses experienced by US banks were due to domestic loans, whereas the credit losses of EA banks were largely due to foreign (US) loans (IMF, 2010) . This paper assesses under what circumstances country-specific shocks trigger a sharp and highly synchronized international downturn.
We address this issue, using a quantitative international business cycle model. While standard macro models developed before the global financial crisis mostly abstracted from financial intermediaries, our model features a globally integrated banking sector.
1 This allows us to account for financial factors in international economic fluctuations. Our model represents a two-country world, where each country is inhabited by a worker and an entrepreneur. The worker provides labor to the local entrepreneur and deposit savings at a globally operating bank, which lends to entrepreneurs in both countries. Entrepreneurs accumulate capital and produce a homogenous tradable good using capital and labor.
We focus on the role of bank capital for the international transmission of macroeconomic and financial shocks. In order to do so, we maintain an aggregate perspective and assume a representative bank, i.e., we abstract from the interbank market, where liquidity shortages can emerge as an additional friction in financial intermediation.
2 Specifically, we assume that the bank has to finance a fraction of the loans using its own funds (equity). We are agnostic as to whether this constraint reflects regulatory requirements or, more broadly, market pressures.
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In equilibrium, the loan rate exceeds the deposit rate; and the interest spread is a decreasing function of the bank's 'excess' capital, i.e., of bank capital held in excess of the target level. We assume exogenous fluctuations in productivity and loan default rates, and calibrate the model to US and EA data. Considering the period 1995-2010, we show that the model is able account for key features of economic fluctuations, including the comovement of macroeconomic aggregates across the US and the EA, as well as the behavior 1 Krugman and Obstfeld (2008) point out that 'one of the most pervasive features of today's banking industry is that banking activities have become globalized.' The growing international orientation of US banks is, e.g., documented in Acharya and Schnabl (2009) , and in Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008) who report that global US banks (banks with positive assets from foreign offices) held 70% of US banking system assets in 2005 (the share of assets from foreign offices within total assets of US global banks exceeded 20% in 2005). External assets and liabilities of US banks (each) represented about 30% of US GDP at the end of September 2009; for Germany, France and the UK, external bank assets and liabilities represent more than 100% of domestic GDP (BIS, 2010) . 2 Disruptions in the interbank market played an important role in the early stages of the global financial crisis (Brunnermeier (2009) ); see Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) for a formal treatment of the interbank market. 3 Traditionally, regulating banks' capital is often justified by limiting moral hazard in the presence of informational frictions and deposit insurance, see Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) . In the present paper we abstract from these issues. Our focus, instead, is on the business cycle implications of bank capital requirements, which we take as given. Finally, we note that our representative global bank may be thought of in more general terms as the global financial sector. "Shadow banks" and other financial institutions too are key players in world financial markets. Yet net worth is an important determinant for all of these actors, whether they are officially classified as "banks" or not.
of financial variables such as loan and deposit volumes, and loan-deposit interest rate spreads. Model simulations show that the bank capital requirement is of little consequence for the international transmission of technology shocks. Moreover, country-specific technology shocks do not generate synchronized international output fluctuations in the set-up here, consistent with similar findings for conventional multi-country models (e.g., Backus et al. 1992) . Our model simulations suggest that the contribution of loan default shocks to business cycle fluctuations is negligible under normal economic conditions. However, the calibrated model predicts that an exceptionally big credit loss in one country, of the magnitude seen in the US during the 2007-2009 recession, triggers a large and persistent decline in domestic and foreign output, by about 2% on impact. To understand this result, note that a loan loss reduces the global bank's capital; due to the bank capital constraint, this raises domestic and foreign loan spreads, thus lowering lending, investment and output in both countries. 4 By contrast, a loan loss shock has virtually no effect on loan spreads and output, in model variants without a bank capital requirement.
The closed economy macro literature has only recently started to develop quantitative dynamic models with banks; see Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) for an early contribution. Aikman and Paustian (2006) , Van den Heuvel (2008) , de Walque et al. (2009) , Angeloni and Faia (2009) and von Peter (2009) use closed economy general equilibrium models to analyze the macroeconomic implications of bank capital requirements. Cúrdia and Woodford (2009) , Roeger (2009) , Dib (2010) , Gerali et al. (2010) and Meh and Moran (2010) embed banks in fairly rich, but closed economy DSGE models. Gerali et al. (op.cit.) estimate their model on time-series data for the EA and find that shocks to bank capital may have sizeable effects on economic activity. Our paper has been written independently of a complementary study by Iacoviello (2010) who presents a closed economy model in which banks, as well as entrepreneurs and impatient households face collateral constraints. He shows that a loan default by impatient households may trigger a sizeable recession, if the bank faces a capital requirement.
International business cycle models have likewise largely abstracted from banks. An exception is Olivero (2010) who studied the implications of a global, imperfectly competitive banking sector for international co-movements; in her analysis, banks do not face a capital requirement. Some recent open-economy studies consider a range of financial factors in order to explain the recent global recession. Mendoza and Quadrini (2010) simultaneously analyze financial globalization and spillovers of country-specific shocks to bank capital. In their two-country model, countries are characterized by different stages of financial development, determining the extent to which households can insure themselves against idiosyncratic income risk; in contrast to our paper, these authors do not study business cycles, as they assume that aggregate capital and production are constant. 5 In a related contribution, Devereux and Yetman (2010) abstract from capital accumulation, banks, and financial shocks, but focus on the international transmission of productivity shocks in the presence of international portfolio holdings by 4 This mechanism is consistent with empirical results by Puri et al. (2010) who show, using German data for 2006-08, that lending was reduced by those retails banks which were particularly exposed to loan losses in the US. Similarly, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2010) identify international banking linkages as a determinant of a reduction in loan supply in emerging market economies after 2007. Our model assumes that a generic entrepreneur in each country borrows from the global bank, and (partially) defaults on bank loans. As our focus is on the international transmission of default shocks, we do not provide a detailed analysis of their origins, which arguably would require an explicit model of the housing sector (see Iacoviello (2010) ). 5 After the present research was completed, several quantitative two-country DSGE models with banks were brought to our attention: Correa et al. (2010) , Davis (2010) and Ueda (2010) ; these authors do not consider the international transmission channel (via a bank capital requirement) discussed here.
leverage-constrained investors; these authors find that, under a high level of financial integration, binding leverage constraints may induce a strong degree of cross-country output co-movement. Finally, Dedola and Lombardo (2010) and Perri and Quadrini (2010) model financial frictions by assuming that firms face borrowing constraints, as debt contracts are imperfectly enforceable; in their settings, a country-specific 'credit shock' (tightening of borrowing constraint), may lead to a decline in global economic activity.
Against this background, our contribution is to show how a country-specific loan loss triggers a worldwide recession in the presence of a global bank that faces a capital requirement. We do so within a quantitative business cycle model which captures key features of actual time-series data. However, in order to illustrate the underlying mechanism as transparently as possible, our analysis abstracts from various frictions which are often considered within larger DSGE models; in particular, we assume that only the bank faces a collateral constraint.
6 Our paper is therefore not meant to provide a complete quantitative account of the global financial crisis. Instead, it is complementary to the studies discussed above.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data which motivate our investigation. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 presents the quantitative results. Section 5 concludes.
Properties of US and EA macroeconomic data
Our goal is to account for key features of US and EA business cycles. Figure 1 shows HP filtered quarterly log real GDP, and demeaned year-on-year (yoy) GDP growth rates, for the US (solid lines) and EA (dashed lines). The sample period is 1975q1-2010q1. (See Appendix for data definitions and sources.) Shaded areas indicate US recessions (according to the NBER). Figure 1 shows that the US cycle has tended to lead the European cycle by a few quarters--with the exception of the latest recession during which output collapsed simultaneously in the US and the EA (see Giannone et al. (2010) for detailed analyses of US-EA macro linkages). We argue below that this key feature of the 2007-2009 recession might be due to a credit loss shock to the globalized financial sector. Figure 2 illustrates important financial aspects of the 2007-2009 recession. 7 The upper left panel shows quarterly time series for loan loss rates of US banks, and of German banks (taken as a proxy for loan loss rates of EA banks, as aggregate EA loan loss data are not available). The loss rates are expressed as annualized percentages of outstanding stocks of loans. The Figure shows that loan loss rates have reached unprecedented levels in [2007] [2008] [2009] . Note that the increase in loss rates was larger for US banks.
According to estimates by the IMF (2010), the total worldwide bank writedowns on loans and securities during 2007-2009 amounted to 2,300 billion USD with about 70% due to loan losses. US and EA banks faced loan losses totaling 588 billion and 440 billion, respectively, according to the IMF estimates. (The ECB has conducted independent calculations, and reports similar figures; see ECB, 2010.) Importantly, losses on foreign loans account for less than 10% of the total loan losses experienced by US banks, while losses on foreign loans represent 60% of the credit losses of EA banks. The total credit losses of US banks represent about 4% of annual US GDP (14 trillion USD in 2007). Under the plausible assumption that a substantial share of the foreign loan losses of EA banks represents losses originating in the US, the total credit losses 6 Our analysis abstracts from of other issues which may also have played a quantitatively important role, in [2007] [2008] [2009] . Examples are oil and commodity price changes, and the zero lower bound (on the nominal interest rate) which constrained monetary policy. 7 Figure 2 plots data for 1995q1-2010q1 (shorter sample, due to lack of earlier synthetic EA data).
originating in the US amount to about 5% of annual US GDP. Below we explore the consequences of a 'loan-default shock' of this size in our quantitative model.
The upper right panel of Figure 2 plots time series for the ratio of bank capital to bank assets, i.e. the 'bank capital ratio', for the US (solid line) and the EA (dashed line), based on accounting measures of bank equity. 8 The bank capital ratios held up fairly well during the recent crisis-but it has been argued that this may partly reflect accounting discretion which has allowed banks to overstate the value of their assets in the crisis (e.g., Huizinga and Laeven 2009) . Figure 2 therefore also plots time series for market prices of US and EA bank equity (Dow Jones bank index; Stoxx Europe 600 Banks); those prices have dropped sharply during the global recession--much more sharply than broad stock market indices (S&P 500; Stoxx Europe). Interestingly, US and EA bank stocks started to decline before the overall market. (All stock indices in Figure 2 are normalized to 100 in 2009q1.). This pronounced and early relative fall in bank stocks distinguishes the current recession from other post-war recessions-and suggests that banking problems were a key aspect of the global recession.
Finally, Figure 2 also plots real loan growth rates (year-on-year), and bank lending rate spreads (in % per annum), for the US and the EA. At the beginning of the global recession, loan growth was still positive, but declined substantially towards the end of the recession; by mid-2009 aggregate US and EA lending contracted sharply. US and EA lending rate spreads started to rise strongly in late 2008. Below, we will assess whether our model matches US and EA business cycles, as described by second moments of HP filtered quarterly macroeconomic data. Table 1 reports key business cycle statistics for 1995q1-2010q1. The first two columns of the Table report standard deviations for output, consumption, investment, employment, deposits, loans, and the loan rate spread, both for the US and the EA. The other columns report correlations with domestic output, and correlations between US and EA variables. Table 1 confirms the well known fact (e.g., King and Rebelo, 1999 ) that consumption and employment are less volatile than GDP, while investment is more volatile. Deposits are somewhat less volatile than GDP, while loans are more volatile. The loan spread is roughly 20%-30% as volatile as (detrended) GDP. Empirically, investment and consumption are highly procyclical. This holds for loans as well, while loan spreads are countercyclical. EA deposits are acyclical. US deposits appear to be countercyclical, but this finding is not robust with respect to the sample period-in a longer sample US deposits are weakly procyclical. All variables considered here exhibit strong cross-country correlations. Interestingly, in our sample the cross-country correlation of output is somewhat lower than that of consumption and investment.
The Model
We consider a world with two countries, called Home and Foreign. In each country there is a representative worker and an entrepreneur. In addition there is a representative global bank. All agents are infinitely lived. The bank collects deposits from Home and Foreign workers, and makes loans to Home and Foreign entrepreneurs. There is a final good, produced by Home and Foreign entrepreneurs using local labor and capital. The good can 8 Note that we divide bank equity by total assets, and not by risk-weighted assets. The capital ratio of US banks is larger than that of EA banks, which reflect differences in the risk structure of US and EA banks' assets, and in accounting standards. (We thank Skander Van den Heuvel for advice on these issues.) 9 We measure spreads as difference between bank loan rates and money market rates. We view this as a proxy for spreads between loan rates and deposit rates (there are no time series for US deposit rates). be traded freely. It is used for consumption by all agents, and for capital accumulation by entrepreneurs. All markets are competitive.
Our analysis centers on the role of a bank capital requirement for the transmission of shocks. We model that capital requirement as a flexible collateral constraint faced by the global bank--it bears a resource cost when deposits fall below a fraction of the bank assets. In order to focus sharply on the effect of this constraint, we assume that workers and entrepreneurs do not face collateral constraints.
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Preferences and technologies have the same structure in both countries. The following exposition thus focuses on the Home country. Foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk.
Agents and Markets
The Home worker The Home worker consumes the final good, provides labor to the Home entrepreneur and invests her savings in one-period bank deposits. Her date t budget constraint is: ). 0 1 β < < is a subjective discount factor.
Workers, entrepreneurs and the banker have the same subjective discount factor. Note that we assume that deposits provide utility to the worker (liquidity services). This allows us to calibrate the model in such a way that, in steady state, the deposit rate is smaller than the lending rate, and that workers hold deposits while entrepreneurs borrow. 11 An alternative setup consistent with a positive loan spread and positive deposits is that workers are more patient than entrepreneurs and the banker. Such a setup allows to dispense with the assumption that deposits provide liquidity services; it delivers very similar results as the 'deposits-in-utility' framework discussed here.
The Home worker maximizes (2) subject to the period-by-budget constraint (1). Ruling out Ponzi schemes, that decision problem has these first-order conditions:
The Home entrepreneur
The Home entrepreneur accumulates physical capital and uses capital and local labor to produce the final good. Home final good output, denoted , t Z is produced using the Cobb-10 Our structure thus differs from models with financial frictions in the tradition of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) . In those models there are no financial intermediaries; entrepreneurs are less patient than workers, and face a collateral constraint for debt, which ensures existence of a stationary equilibrium. 11 For simplicity, we assume that the (sub-)utility functions of consumption and deposits have the same CRRA form. This follows the typical 'money-in-the-utility-function' specifications used in the macro literature (deposits represent 'money' in our model); e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) , p.661. Our results do not hinge on this assumption (see below).
Douglas technology
Home TFP t θ is an exogenous random variable that follows an AR(1) process (see below). ξ ξ > ≥ The Home entrepreneur's period t budget constraint is:
where t L is a one-period bank loan received by the Home entrepreneur in period t.
≤ ≤ is an exogenous stochastic loan default rate: at t, the entrepreneur only pays back a fraction 1
gross loan rate between t-1 and t. L t R is set at t-1, while L t δ is realized at t. In stochastic model simulations discussed below, we assume that the default rate is autocorrelated and that its innovations are correlated with innovations to total factor productivity (according to empirical estimates). 
). Maximization of that life-time utility subject to (3) yields these first-order conditions:
(1 )
is the marginal cost of gross investment at date t. We assume that the bank can hold less capital than the required level, but that this is costly (e.g., because the bank then has to engage in creative accounting). Let 
The global bank
that is increasing and linear in deposits and loans, i.e.
, 0
D L
Γ Γ > (we assume that marginal operating costs are time-invariant). The bank's period t budget constraint is:
where
d is the profit (dividend) generated by the bank at t.
L t R and *L t R are the gross interest rates between t-1 and t on loans made to the Home and Foreign entrepreneurs, respectively (Home and Foreign loan rates differ as loan default rates differ across countries). The banker does not have access to other assets, and thus she consumes her dividends. Her expected life-time utility at t is:
.The banker maximizes life-time utility subject to (5). Ruling out Ponzi schemes, that problem has these first-order conditions:
. By accepting more deposits at t, the banker can increase her date t consumption, at the cost of a reduction of consumption at t+1. Specifically, when the bank raises deposits 
At a maximum of the bank's decision problem, the expected marginal benefit equals the marginal cost (see eq. (6)). If the bank raises Home loans by one unit at t (holding constant deposits), then this lowers her date t dividend by 1
( 1 ) '.
L t γ φ +Γ + −
The bank's effective (gross) real rate of return on loans to the Home entrepreneur is thus
which explains the Euler equation (7) (the same logic explains (8), which together with equation (7) implies a no-arbitrage condition between the effective return on loans to entrepreneurs in both countries; see below).
Market clearing, definition of GDP
Market clearing for the final good requires: We assume that the bank purchases the resources that are necessary for Home deposits and Home lending, ( , ) ( (1 ) )
This definition of GDP ensures that world GDP equals world consumption (by all agents) plus world physical investment. Our calibration (see below) uses an investment cost function ξ such that ( ) t t I I ξ ≅ holds up to a first order approximation. Hence, the final good market clearing condition (9), and (10) (and the counterpart of (10) for the Foreign country) imply, up to first order:
Discussion
Loan rate spreads and bank capital As deposits provide liquidity services to workers, and as financial intermediation is costly, the deposit rate is lower than the loan rate. Let
be the expected effective gross interest rates (i.e. loan rates, net of the expected default rate) on loans to the Home entrepreneur and to the Foreign entrepreneur, respectively. Up to a certainty-equivalent approximation, the bank's Euler equations (7)-
, i.e. that expected effective loan rates are equated across countries. 14 Furthermore (from (6) and (7)):
which implies that approximately:
where a linear approximation of ( ) (4), (7), (8) ). To provide intuition for this effect, we now analyze in greater detail the optimizing behavior of the bank, for the special case where the bank has log utility ( 1)
Up to a first-order approximation of the banker's decision rule (around a deterministic steady state), her optimal date t consumption then equals a fraction 1 β − of her beginning-of-period (net) wealth:
Let
(13) be the bank's end-of-period t wealth, plus the costs incurred by the bank at t. Equation (12) and the bank budget constraint (5) imply that the bank optimally sets 1 t A + at a fraction β of her beginning-of period wealth: (1 ) (11)). Up to a first-order approximation of (13) R R R are set in t-1, which implies that the right-hand sides of (12) and (14) do not respond to date t TFP innovations. 17 A linear approximation of (13) ( (4), (6), (7)).
a fall in excess bank capital t x , which raises the loan spread, when '' 0.
φ > The financial friction thus becomes more severe when an unanticipated credit loss occurs. An unanticipated Home TFP shock in period t raises the Home worker's wage income and thus increases her holdings of deposits. As shown above, on impact, the shock has no effect on the banker's end-of-period wealth, (15)), which raises the loan spread, if " 0.
φ > As shown below, this dampens the positive effect of the productivity shock on investment and output. The effects of a productivity shock are thus mitigated relative to a situation without an operative bank capital requirement ( '' 0).
φ =

Calibration Final good technology, capital accumulation
The elasticity of final good output with respect to capital is set at α=0.3, consistent with the capital share of roughly 30% observed in the US and EA. One period represents one quarter in calendar time. Accordingly, we set the depreciation rate of physical capital at δ=0.025, a commonly used value in quarterly macro models and consistent with the empirical estimates of that parameter provided by, e.g., Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) . We solve the model using a linear approximation of the equilibrium conditions. Hence, we have to calibrate the first and second derivatives of the investment cost function at the steady state value of investment. We assume that '( ) 1, I ξ = where I K δ = is (Home) steady state investment. In each model variant considered below, we set ''( ) I ξ at the value for which, in stochastic simulations with all simultaneous shocks, the predicted 'relative volatility' of investment (ratio of the standard deviations of investment to the standard deviation of GDP) is 3.34 in each country. 18 This corresponds to the mean value of US and EA relative quarterly investment volatility during the period 1995q1-2010q1.
Bank and preference parameters
The required bank capital ratio is set at 0.05.
γ =
Empirically, the capital ratios of the major EA banks and of major US investment banks (i.e., ratios of bank equity to total (non risk-weighted) assets) have typically ranged between 3% and 5% in the period 1995-2010, while the capital ratios of US commercial banks have generally been in the range of 7%-8%; see, e.g., D'Hulster (2009) and ECB (2010) . 19 Below, we provide a sensitivity analysis with respect to .
γ
We set the steady state loan default rate at 0.95% per annum, which corresponds to the average US and EA loan loss rate in 1995-2010 (see Figure 2) . Note that, in the model, the steady state default rate does not affect real activity. The steady state deposit rate and effective loan rate (net of default) are set at 1% and 2.5% per annum, respectively, which implies a steady state observed (contractual) loan rate of 3.48% p.a. Thus, the steady state loan-deposit spread is 2.48% p.a., which matches the average of US and EA loan spreads during the past decade. 19 As discussed by D'Hulster (2009), p.2, US regulation prescribes a minimum bank capital ratio of 3% for banks rated 'strong' and 4% for all other banks. " Banks' actual leverage ratios are typically higher than the minimum, however, because banks are also subject to prompt corrective action rules requiring them to maintain a minimum leverage ratio of 5% to be considered 'well capitalized' ".
We thus set the (quarterly) subjective discount factor at 0.9938
from the Home entrepreneur's Euler equation (4)). The bank's Euler equations (6) and (7) imply 1 '
consistent with these conditions generates the same deterministic steady state, and the same first-order dynamics of endogenous variables. The baseline calibration assumes that workers and bankers have log utility, 1.
σ =
We assume that entrepreneurs are less risk averse, and set 0.01 E σ = (i.e. entrepreneurs are almost risk neutral). This implies that entrepreneurial consumption is more volatile than aggregate consumption, which is consistent with the data. 20 We assume that excess bank capital is zero in steady state, (1 ) ,
and set the loans to physical capital ratio at 1/3:
This pins down the workers' preference parameters , D N Ψ Ψ . 21 The calibration entails that the ratio of loans to annual GDP is 81% in steady state. Empirically, the mean ratio of bank loans to non-financial businesses divided by annual GDP was about 45% in the US, and 90% in the EA, during the past decade. The steady state ratio in the model lies between these empirical ratios.
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Finally, we have to calibrate the curvature of the cost of excess bank capital, φ (curvature of ') φ , and found that they closely resemble the linearized solutions. 
Quantitative Results
Impulse responses
We now discuss dynamic responses to innovations to Home TFP and to the Home credit loss rate. In each case, we focus on an isolated innovation, assuming that all other exogenous innovations are zero.
Effects of a TFP shock
The solid lines in Figure 3 represent responses to a 1% innovation to Home TFP in the baseline version of the model. The dashed lines represent responses to the same shock in a variant of the model where the marginal cost of violating the capital requirement is constant, i.e. '' 0.
In accordance with the fitted AR(1) processes discussed above, we assume that after the innovation Home TFP decays at a rate of 95% per period (Foreign TFP is unaffected by the shock). In the Figure, the responses of interest rates and of the loan rate spread are expressed in percentage points per annum. The responses of all other variables are expressed as percentages of their respective steady state values. Figure 3 shows that the responses of Home and Foreign GDP, aggregate consumption, and investment to the Home TFP shock are very similar across the two model variants. 26 Thus, the convex cost of violating the bank capital constraint does not significantly alter the effect of the TFP shock on real activity. In the baseline structure, the 1% shock to Home TFP raises Home GDP, aggregate consumption, and investment by 1.87%, 0.59% and 7.75% on impact, respectively. The corresponding responses in the model variant with '' 0 φ = are 1.91%, 0.60% and 7.91%, respectively. Home bank loans and deposits rise under both variants (by about 0.4% and 0.3% on impact). The strong rise in Home investment is accompanied by a brief fall in Home net exports (in the first three periods).
Foreign real activity responds much less strongly to the Home TFP shock than Home activity. As in standard International Real Business Cycle models with complete financial markets (e.g., Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) , Kollmann (1996) or Coeurdacier, Kollmann and Martin (2010) ), a Home TFP increase lowers Foreign investment. This is due to the fact that the Home investment boom triggers a rise in the loan rate. Foreign aggregate consumption falls somewhat on impact (-0.05%), and rises thereafter slightly above its unshocked path. Foreign GDP rises very slightly on impact, but falls afterwards below its unshocked path (-0.15%, four periods after the shock).
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The Home TFP shock raises the Home worker's labor income. As Home TFP decays gradually after the shock, the rise in Home labor income is temporary. Thus, the Home worker saves more, i.e., her bank deposit increases. On impact, world-wide bank deposits and loans rise by 0.145% and 0.137%, respectively, in the baseline model with '' 0. φ > As deposits rise (slightly) more strongly than loans, the bank's capital ratio falls by 0.15%, and the bank's excess capital t x falls too (by 0.006% of annual world GDP).
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The simulations thus confirm the analytical result derived above that a positive TFP shock lowers the bank's excess capital, on impact. In fact, the simulation shows that the fall in bank capital is quite persistent. (Bank capital falls somewhat more in the model variant with '' 0, φ = than in the baseline variant.)
The loan spread is (essentially) unaffected by the TFP shock when '' 0, φ = as the marginal cost of violating the capital requirement is constant in this case. By contrast, the loan spread rises in the baseline model variant. However, this effect is modest, due to the weak fall in the bank capital ratio and the low sensitivity of the spread to the capital ratio 25 In this case, temporary shocks have permanent effects on bank capital. The results reported here are indistinguishable from predictions that obtain when '' φ is set at a very small positive value 5 ( '' 10 ) φ − = , which ensures stationarity. 26 We assume that 50% of the banker's consumption is realized in the Home country; thus Home (Foreign) aggregate consumption is: (see above): on impact the spread rises merely by one basis point (bp); four quarters after the shock, the spread goes up by five bp. This muted response of the spread explains why the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to the TFP shock are similar across the two model variants. But note that Home GDP, consumption, and investment rise slightly less in the baseline model (because lending to the Home entrepreneur rises less strongly). Hence, the presence of the bank capital constraint dampens somewhat the response of Home GDP to a Home TFP shock. Figure 4 shows dynamic responses to a one-time unexpected increase in the Home credit loss rate worth 5% of steady state annual Home GDP, while there are no innovations to the other shock processes (one period after the shock, the loss rate returns to its steady state value). This experiment is meant to capture the exceptional events of 2007-2009: the shock roughly corresponds to the observed credit losses originating in the US during that period (see Section 2). 29 An alternative crisis scenario (with a gradual rise in the default rate) is discussed below. In both model variants, the Home credit loss lowers the bank's capital ratio by 57% on impact. In the baseline model, the bank capital ratio then slowly reverts to its preshock level. 20 quarters after the shock, the bank capital ratio remains 21% below its unshocked value. By contrast, the fall in the bank capital ratio is permanent in the model variant with '' 0 φ = (no reversion to pre-shock value).
Effects of a credit loss shock
In the baseline model, the fall in bank capital leads to a sizeable and persistent rise in the loan-deposit spread (+50 basis points on impact). 30 There is a sizeable and persistent fall in the deposit rate (on impact: -55 bp; after 20 quarters: -14 bp); the loan rate falls slightly on impact (-5 bp), before rising above its pre-shock value. The rise in the loan spread (observed in the baseline model) is accompanied by a fall in loans, deposits, investment, and aggregate consumption in both countries. 31 In contrast, loan and deposit 29 Figure 4 thus does not use the fitted AR(1) credit loss process described in Sect.3.3. The fitted process is used below in simulations designed to quantify the role of default shocks for conventional business cycles. 30 As Figure 4 considers a one-time increase in the Home loan default rate, the expected future default rate is unaffected; the effective (expected) Home interest rate spread The banker's consumption falls sharply, on impact (-57%). By contrast, Home and Foreign workers' consumption rises (the strong and persistent reduction in the deposit rate induces workers to save less). The consumption of Home and Foreign entrepreneurs falls too on impact (-20%), due to the rise in the (future) loan rate, and the high intertemporal elasticity of substitution of entrepreneurs. But the Home entrepreneur's life-time utility increases, as her consumption rises sufficiently in later periods. (If entrepreneurs were as risk averse as workers, then the Home entrepreneur's consumption would rise on impact, and total Home consumption would rise too; however, Home and Foreign output would continue to fall significantly, as in the baseline calibration.) The positive welfare effect (for the entrepreneur) is an implication of considering a default shock in isolation. In reality, default is negatively correlated with TFP, and thus entrepreneurs are typically worse off when default rates are high (than in times of low default).
rates are unaffected by the credit loss shock in the model variant with '' 0; φ = in that variant, the consumption of the Home entrepreneur rises slightly, while the consumption of the banker falls; aggregate Home consumption and investment are essentially unaffected. The experiment in Figure 4 assumes an unanticipated one-time rise in the loan default rate. Yet, actual loan losses rose gradually over the period [2007] [2008] [2009] , as shown in Fig.2 . It seems plausible that, once the crisis had started, some of the subsequent losses were anticipated. In our model (with one-period loans), anticipated defaults are fully reflected in the contractual loan rate and thus leave bank capital unaffected. However, to the extent that, in reality, loan contracts have a multi-period maturity, and that loan rates are not renegotiated on a period-by-period basis, bank capital is likely to have suffered from these anticipated loan losses after the onset of the crisis. In order to capture this notion, Figure 5 shows results obtained from assuming an anticipated multi-period transfer from the global bank to the Home entrepreneur. The transfer is zero at t=0, but agents learn at t=0 that the transfer will be positive and rising for the next 4 periods, before it declines. The lower right panel of Figure 5 shows the trajectory of the transfer (expressed in percentage points of Home steady state annual GDP), which resembles the (actual and projected) US credit losses reported in IMF (2010). The transfer totals 5% of steady state annual Home GDP. Overall, the dynamic responses are similar to those reported in Figure 4 (unanticipated credit loss), except that the adjustment dynamics of GDP is now humpshaped. Note also that output already declines at t=0, i.e. before the transfer materializes.
We also conduct a number of other experiments to explore the robustness of the When ''(0) φ is greater, the loan spread rises more strongly on impact; as deviations from the required bank capital ratio are more costly than in the baseline model, the bank capital ratio returns to its pre-shock value more rapidly. This induces a sharper initial recession, but a faster return to steady state levels.
Next, we consider a stricter bank capital requirement, and set the target value of the bank capital ratio at 0.1 γ = (twice the baseline value). The green dashed-dotted lines in Figure 6 show the responses to the one-time credit loss, for this case. Results are fairly similar to those of the baseline model. 
Do the bank capital channel and loan default shocks matter under normal economic conditions?
The preceding results suggest that shocks affecting bank capital are key to understanding the 2007-2009 recession. However, the bank capital channel may not matter greatly for conventional business cycles. Table 2 reports unconditional business cycle statistics generated by the model, using the fitted AR(1) processes for TFP and loan losses reported in Section 3.3. Note that Table 2 thus assumes an (estimated) standard deviation of the innovations to the quarterly credit loss rate of 0.0282%, which is much smaller than the loss rates observed in [2007] [2008] [2009] . As for the empirical statistics in Table 1 , the theoretical statistics shown here are computed on HP-filtered variables (all variables, except the credit spread, are logged before applying the HP filter). Table 2 compares the business cycle properties of the baseline model (Columns 1-3) and those of the model variant without an operative bank capital constraint (Columns 4-5 labeled 'Model with '' 0 ' φ = ) to (average) empirical statistics for the US and EA (last Column). In line with the impulse responses discussed above, we find that the bank capital constraint dampens the fluctuations of real activity induced by TFP shocks, and that it generates larger fluctuations of GDP in response to default shocks. However, quantitatively its effect on business cycle statistics is small. Note that the baseline model predicts that the standard deviation of GDP is 1.36% when there are only TFP shocks, 0.02% with just loan default shocks, and 1.37% with both shocks simultaneously (see Columns 1-3). Without an operative bank capital constraint ( '' 0) φ = , the standard deviation of GDP is 1.41% with just TFP shocks, and 0.000073% with loan default shocks only (Column 5). Thus, loan loss shocks only have a negligible effect on the unconditional standard deviation of real activity.
The model generates a predicted volatility of GDP that is roughly in line with actual volatility (actual standard deviations of GDP: 1.12% (US), 1.42% (EA)). Like standard RBC models, the model here predicts that (aggregate) consumption is less volatile than GDP. Our model explains about a third of the actual volatility of the loan rate spread. It underpredicts the volatility of loans, but it generates a volatility of deposits that is close to the data. Furthermore, the model matches the fact that consumption and investment are highly correlated with domestic GDP. It also predicts that loans are more procyclical than deposits, which is consistent with the data. Interestingly, both model variants explain the fact that the credit spread is negatively correlated with GDP. This result is driven by the assumed negative correlation between TFP and the loan default rate; by contrast, the assumed negative correlation between TFP and credit loss innovations is of minor importance for the other moments, as those moments are essentially driven by TFP shocks.
In the baseline model, the standard deviation of entrepreneurs' consumption (not shown in Table) is 5% (i.e., E t d is about 8 times more volatile than aggregate consumption), while the consumption (dividend income) of the banker is roughly as volatile as aggregate consumption. 33 The main business cycle statistics are unaffected when we assume that the banker is less risk averse than in the baseline model. Setting the banker's coefficient of relative risk aversion at 0.1 (instead of 1) implies that the predicted standard deviation of her consumption equals that of entrepreneurs' consumption (5%). However, the predicted standard deviations of GDP (1.38%) and of the loan rate spread are essentially unaffected compared to the baseline model.
The model matches the fact that output, consumption, investment, deposits, loans, loan rates and loan spreads are highly positively correlated across countries. This reflects our assumption that shocks are highly positively correlated across countries. In the set-up here, country-specific technology shocks do not generate synchronized international output fluctuations, in line with similar findings for conventional multi-country models (e.g., Backus et al. 1992) . In particular, setting the cross-country correlation of TFP to zero lowers the predicted cross-country output correlation to -0.05.
The irrelevance of the bank capital channel and of default shocks for business cycle statistics is robust to a range of parameter changes. For example, it continues to hold when the convexity of the bank's cost of excess capital is increased. Even when ''(0) φ is multiplied by a factor of 10, the predicted standard deviation of GDP remains very low when there are only default shocks (0.04%); the relative standard deviation of the loan rate spread (in % p.a.) also only rises slightly (to 0.12).
Conclusion
In this paper we have explored the macroeconomic consequences of a globally integrated banking sector, using a quantitative two-country business cycle model. In the model, cyclical fluctuations are the result of productivity and loan default shocks. We have calibrated the model using US and Euro Area data and shown that it delivers successful predictions for key business cycle statistics. Several key results emerge. First, a bank capital constraint hardly affects the international transmission of productivity shocks. Second, loan default shocks are of little consequence for conventional business cycles. However, the countercylical behavior of actual interest rate spreads can only be accounted for by the model when default shocks are assumed. Third, when subjected to a country-specific loan default shock of the size seen in the US during In order to highlight the role of the global financial sector for the international transmission of shocks, our analysis has abstracted from a number of issues which may also have played a quantitatively important role, in [2007] [2008] [2009] . Examples are oil and commodity price changes, the collapse of international trade, and the zero lower bound which constrained monetary policy. We leave an analysis of these issues, within our framework, for future research. (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
where 1 1 (1 ) ,
which follows from our assumption that countries are symmetric and that steady state excess bank capital is zero). To obtain estimates of (0) '' φ that do not depend on (arbitrary) normalizations (choices of units) for loans, we assume that (0) 
is the (steady state) share of Home GDP in world GDP.
We construct quarterly time series for t z (1999q1-2010q1), using logged series for ratios of (stocks of) loans to deposits in the US (country 'Home') and in the EA (country 'Foreign'). (sample averages of the ratios of loans to quarterly GDP in the US and EA, respectively). Recall that the model predicts that Home and Foreign effective (expected) credit spreads are identical. We fit (A2) to a weighted average of US and EA credit spreads (using weights s=0.567 and 1-s respectively). Note that (A2) pertains to the effective (expected) credit spread, (Fagan et al., 2001) to construct a longer time series for EA output on the basis of growth rates. US data for loan write-offs are from the Federal Reserve Board (charge-off and delinquency rates on loans and leases at all insured US-chartered commercial banks). As loan write-off data for EA are not available, we use German data as a proxy. Annual data for loan write-offs of German banks (in percent of total loans) are from IMF (2010); we interpolate quarterly observations using cubic splines. US data for bank equity/assets are from the FRED database (St. Louis Fed).
For the US, data on loans and deposits for all commercial banks are from the Federal Reserve Board (H.8 Table, May 28, 2010) . For the EA, data on loans of MFIs to non-financial corporations and households, and deposits by non-financial corporations and households are from the ECB. We deflate the series with the GDP deflator.
Our measure for US interest rate spreads is from the Federal Reserve Board (survey of terms of business lending), capturing commercial and industrial loan rate spreads over the intended federal funds rate (all loans). For the EA, we construct a measure for the loan rate, drawing on ECB data (from July 2003 onwards: loans other than revolving loans and overdrafts, convenience and extended credit card debt, Over 1 and up to 5 years, Up to and including EUR 1 million, new business) and Bundesbank (long term credit of firms: 500,000 to 5 Mio euro, effective rate, averages) to backtrack the EA series up to 1997. To obtain an EA interest rate spread measure comparable to the US spread, we subtract the EONIA rate (from ECB).
US stock market indices are from www.freelunch.com (S&P 500) and from Dow Jones. For the EA, data are from Euro Stoxx: Europe 600 and Europe 600 banks.
Our TFP measure is constructed using real GDP and total employment data from the Economic Outlook database of the OECD (assuming a 70% labor share, as in model).
For the US, annual net real dividend payments of the finance and insurance industry (aggregate net dividend payments of other sectors) and real corporate profits of the US financial sector (and the corresponding series for the non-financial sector) are from BEA/NIPA. (Quarterly series for dividends not available from this source.) and with just H and F loan default rate shocks, respectively). The Column labeled 'Data' shows average empirical statistics for the US and EA (1995q1-2010q1), see Table 1 (the empirical 'hours' measure is employment). All statistics pertain to HP filtered variables; all variables except the loan rate spread were logged before applying the HP filter. 
